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O! I could prophesy. .  . 
Henry IV  Part 1 
We  can’t even predict the next drip from a dripping tap when it 
gets irregular. Each drop sets up the conditions for the next, the 
smallest variation blows prediction apart, and the weather is unpre- 
dictable the same way, will always be unpredictable. . . . The fu- 
ture is disorder. 
Tom Stoppard, Arcadia 
Many Americans now look forward to retirement. Most enjoy the health and 
the income needed to pursue the good life. Previous generations were not as 
lucky. At the beginning of this century few men could afford to retire. Many 
of those who retired did so because of poor health or employment prospects 
and became dependent either on charity or on their family. Rising incomes 
have enabled more men to withdraw from the labor force. Now income, health, 
and employment prospects are not the important determinants of the retirement 
decision they once were. A bit of income and the relatively inexpensive amuse- 
ments provided by mass tourism and mass entertainment have made retirement 
both common and highly valued. Will the number of years spent in retirement 
continue to increase, either because the trend toward earlier retirement contin- 
ues or because longevity increases even further? Will we be faced with both 
an aging population and a population of retirees? While I cannot prophesy, I 
believe that the past provides insight. The demographic and economic pro- 
cesses that have produced an aging population and rising retirement rates have 
been ongoing for more than a century. 
9.1  An Aging Population 
The population of the United States has been aging for over a century, slowly 
at first, rapidly in recent times. Figure 9.1  shows that, in  1850, less than 3 
percent of the population was older than sixty-four and in 1910 only 4 percent. 
By 1940 the figure was 7 percent and by  1990 13 percent. By 2050 the figure 
is projected to rise to least 20 percent. 
Both increases in longevity and declines in the number of live births account 
for increases in the relative size of the elderly population. The effect of these 
two phenomena on the age distribution of the population can be seen in figures 
9.2 and 9.3. These plots show that, whereas the age distribution of the popula- 
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Fig. 9.1  Percentage population older than 64 (actual and projected), 1850-2050 
Note: The percentage  of  the population older than sixty-four in  1850 was estimated from the 
integrated public-use census sample (Ruggles and Sobek  1995). The percentage for 1860 was 
interpolated. All other actual percentages are from Series  A 119-134 in U.S. Bureau of the Census 
(1975, 15) and from table 14 in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1993, 15). The projections are from 
Day (1993) and are the Census Bureau’s middle series. 
tion could be represented by a pyramid in the nineteenth century, the base of 
the  pyramid  was  narrower  in  1910 and  1940. Fertility  declined  steadily 
throughout the nineteenth century and then so sharply during the 1920s and 
early 1930s that not enough women were born during the depression to replace 
the women then leaving childbearing age. By  1940 a decline in both fertility 
and mortality led to 7 percent of the population being older than sixty-four. 
Population aging was even more pronounced after 1940, with some notable 
exceptions. The birthrate increased at an unprecedented rate between 1946 and 
1964, reaching a peak in 1957, when more than 4.3 million babies were born. 
At the same time life expectancy at birth rose by  almost four years, largely 
because of  declining childhood mortality. Figure 9.3  shows that in  1970 the 
age distribution narrowed at young adult ages both because so few children 
were born in the 1930s and because the baby boom of the 1950s widened the 
age distribution during the teen years. Because the baby boom was followed 
by  a baby bust, during which fertility dropped to its lowest levels in American 
history, the baby-boom generation has produced a “pig-in-a-python” bulge in 
the age distribution. Thus, in  1995 the age distribution was very narrow at 
young ages, bulged at ages thirty to forty-nine, and again narrowed sharply 
when the depression cohort reached ages fifty-five to sixty-five. 
The aging of the baby-boom generation will dramatically raise the propor- 
tion of  the population older than sixty-four. In 2025, when the baby-boom 
generation will be between ages sixty and eighty, 18 percent of the population 
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Fig. 9.2  Age distribution of the population, 1850-1940 
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Fig. 9.3  Age distribution of the population, 1970-2050 
Nore; The distribution for 1970 was calculated from the integrated public-use census samples (Ruggles  and Sobek 
1995). The distributions for 1995, 2025, and 2050 are from Day (1993) and are the Census Bureau's  middle- 
series projections. 192  Chapter9 
population will be older than seventy-nine and 5 percent older than eighty-four. 
If life expectancies increase faster than expected, the percentage of the pop- 
ulation older than sixty-four in 2025 and in 2050 may be even greater than the 
18 and 20 percent, respectively, predicted by  the intermediate projections of 
the Census Bureau and reproduced in figure 9.3.  Since 1970 about half the 
increases in life expectancy can be attributed to improved older-age mortality.' 
Because 80 percent of all individuals now survive to age sixty-five, any sub- 
stantial improvements in future life expectancy are therefore likely to result 
from declining mortality above age sixty-five. 
Whether future increases in life expectancy are possible depends on whether 
as a species we have reached a genetically programmed limit to life expec- 
tancy. Although the debate continues over whether the life span is genetically 
fixed, recent research suggests that it is not or that, if  it is, the limit is well 
above the age of  eighty-five, as originally postulated by  Fries (1980,  1989). 
Vaupel (1991) has argued that children alive today may live ninety or even a 
hundred years on average. If there were well-defined limits on the length of the 
life span, then, when chronic conditions do not strike prematurely, mortality 
rates should accelerate rapidly at older ages. But the probability of survivor- 
ship after age eighty has increased sharply, and survivorship curves of the pop- 
ulation aged eighty or older do not indicate an increase in age-specific mortal- 
ity (Manton and Vaupel 1995). These findings suggest that, although genetics 
may affect vulnerability to environmental factors, absolute life spans are not 
necessarily rigidly determined by genetics. 
Just how  long are the baby boomers likely to live? Kannisto (1994) has 
found that the decline in older-age mortality in developing countries since 
1950 has proceeded at widely varying speeds, sometimes sluggish, sometimes 
rapid, and that there have even been occasional short periods of mortality in- 
creases. Unfortunately, we do not yet know how to incorporate changes in so- 
cioeconomic conditions, medical technology, and the other factors that have 
led to mortality declines into our forecasts. One promising line of  recent re- 
search is to use knowledge of early life conditions to better inform our predic- 
tions. Studies of Britain, France, and Italy conclude that the mortality experi- 
ence of  a cohort is largely determined by  the first fifteen years of  life, with 
improvements in adult mortality following mortality declines in the first fifteen 
years of life, while declines in infant mortality lagged behind until maternal 
health improved (Caselli and Capocaccia 1989; Kermack, McKendrick, and 
McKinlay 1934a, 1934b; Preston and van de Walle 1978). Buck and Simpson 
(1982) found a high correlation in the United States between diarrheal deaths 
from birth to age twenty in 1917-21  and death rates from arteriosclerotic heart 
disease at ages forty to forty-four and fifty to fifty-four. Many of the degenera- 
tive conditions of old age, such as coronary heart disease, hypertension, stroke, 
non-insulin-dependent diabetes, and autoimmune thyroiditis, have been linked 
to exposure to infectious disease, malnutrition, and other types of biomedical 
and socioeconomic stress early in life (Barker 1992, 1994). In their review of 
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(1  992, 204) concluded, “Results from many empirical studies support the no- 
tion that childhood conditions play a major role in adult mortality.” 
Relative to their predecessors, the baby boomers have, indeed, been fortu- 
nate. Between  1920 and  1950 mortality rates from birth until age five  fell 
sharply. Whereas only 83 percent of individuals reached age five in 1920, by 
1950 97 percent did. The four-centimeter increase in adult height for cohorts 
born between 1920 and 1950, documented in this book, also implies that early 
life conditions improved. The baby boomers were the first generation born in 
the age of antibiotics, when it became possible to cure the infectious diseases 
of  infancy and early childhood before they led to large reductions in the rate 
of growth or damaged developing organs. The early baby boomers have  not 
yet reached age sixty-five. They will not begin to reach age ninety until 2035. 
As pointed out by Preston (1993), those who would reach ninety in 1996 were 
born in 1906, when life expectancy at birth was only fifty years, one of twelve 
children did not survive infancy, and the burden of  infectious diseases was 
exceptionally heavy. Nonetheless, they were born at a time when life expec- 
tancy at birth had improved. In fact, improvements in the disease environment 
that resulted in the development of better physiques and less scarring by the 
sequelae of infectious disease may explain the increase in the size of the “old- 
old” population since the 1970s. The marked improvement in early life condi- 
tions between 1920 and 1950 suggests that the life expectancies of the elderly 
will increase rapidly at least twenty years into the future and that the increase 
may be more rapid than that observed over the last twenty years. Census and 
Social Security Bureau projections of the size of the elderly population, projec- 
tions that are based on recent mortality declines, are therefore likely to be off 
the mark. 
9.2  A Retired Population 
When the baby boomers begin to retire in 2010, the strain on the Social 
Security retirement system, even under the Social Security Board‘s intermedi- 
ate projections, is expected to be substantial. The number of beneficiaries is 
expected to increase much more rapidly than the number of covered workers. 
Under the intermediate projections of the Social Security Board of Trustees, 
trust funds for Old Age and Survivors Insurance and for Disability Insurance 
will be depleted in 2029. Financing the Social Security retirement and disabil- 
ity program  with  incoming tax  revenues  alone implies that  the combined 
employer-employee tax rate plus income taxes on benefits would have to rise 
to 17 percent of taxable payroll from 13 percent today. After 2029, taxes would 
have to be even higher (Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survi- 
vors Insurance and Disability Trust Funds 1996). If, as is likely, the baby boom- 
ers’ life expectancies exceed those assumed by the intermediate projections of 
the Social Security Board, the strain on the Social Security retirement system 
will be even greater. 
Another major transfer program affecting the elderly is Medicare, providing 194  Chapter9 
coverage to virtually  all those age sixty-five or older (Congressional Budget 
Office 1993). Like Social Security and Disability Insurance, Medicare is not 
adequately financed either, and depletion of Medicare funds is expected by the 
year 2001 (Board of Trustees of  the Federal  Hospital  Insurance Trust Fund 
1996). Assuming that the deficit is met by increasing taxes, expected increases 
in  the  size of  the elderly population  under the intermediate projects  of the 
Hospital Insurance Board of  Trustees imply that outlays on federal  Hospital 
Insurance alone will consume 3 percent of GDP by  2020 and 4% percent by 
2050, up sharply from the  11/2 percent consumed today (Board of Trustees of 
the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund  1996). Of particular  concern are 
increases in the size of the oldest-old population. Those eighty-five years of 
age or older are almost twice as likely as those aged sixty-five to seventy-four 
to enter a short-stay hospital, and their stays there are 11 percent longer. They 
are almost four times as likely to enter a skilled nursing facility, and their stays 
there are 18 percent longer. Total Medicare program payments to those older 
than eighty-four are 60 percent higher.’ 
The crisis in Social Security is likely to be deeper than predicted by  the 
intermediate projections of the Social Security Board. The American popula- 
tion has been growing healthier since the end of the nineteenth century. Men 
are no longer dangerously thin, and they no longer face the childhood disease 
and  poor  nutrition  that  may  stunt their  growth. This  book  has  shown  that 
chronic disease rates among the elderly have declined across a century. Disabil- 
ity rates among the elderly have also declined recently (Manton, Corder, and 
Stallard 1993). Trends in adult height and early life conditions suggest that the 
baby boomers will enjoy a particularly healthy and long-lived old age. But we 
cannot expect that, because the baby boomers will enjoy better health in their 
old age compared to past generations, health care costs will fall. Kim (1996) 
finds that the improvement  in health  will not be large enough completely to 
relieve the health  care burden  caused by  an elderly population  that will be 
larger both in terms of absolute numbers and as a proportion of the population. 
Innovations in medical technology combined with rising incomes may produce 
further increases in the demand for medical care. 
Ballooning pension and health care costs have led to a shift in government 
policy from the promotion of retirement to the promotion of elderly labor force 
participation.  By increasing the  labor supply of  the elderly, the government 
could raise tax revenue that could help finance  Social Security pension and 
health  care costs. Most of  the members of the  1994-95  Technical Panel on 
Trends and Issues in Retirement Savings of the Social Security Advisory Coun- 
cil favored further increases in the age at which full benefits are to be received 
and agreed that the age should eventually be indexed to life expectancy. Most 
panel members also believed that the early entitlement age for Social Security 
benefits should be raised as well from sixty-two to sixty-four or sixty-five. In 
addition to cutting benefits by increasing entitlement ages, many policy makers 
have proposed abolishing the earnings test, whereby Social Security benefits 
are reduced for each dollar in excess of the earnings threshold. 195  Looking to the Future 
How will the baby boomers fare if Social Security benefits are reduced? The 
proposed changes to the Social Security system would give households enough 
time to increase their savings rate to maintain their retirement income. The 
higher working income of baby boomers relative to that of their parents might 
foreshadow a higher private retirement income. Baby boomers have both sig- 
nificantly higher real incomes and greater accumulated wealth than their par- 
ents did at comparable ages (Cantor and Yuengert 1994; Congressional Budget 
Office 1993; Easterlin, Schaeffer, and Macunovich 1993), but baby-boomer 
households are not saving enough to maintain their current living standard into 
retirement (Bernheim and Scholz 1993). The problem is particularly acute for 
lower-income households. These are households that might well expect Social 
Security to replace their income adequately. Because the Social Security bene- 
fits of low-income households are not taxed, an individual who has had average 
earnings during his entire working life and who retires at age sixty-five with a 
dependent spouse now receives benefits that replace more than 80 percent of 
peak preretirement net-of-tax income (Feldstein 1996). These are the house- 
holds that are most likely to be affected if Social Security benefits are reduced, 
not the well-to-do, much of whose retirement is financed by private pension 
plans. 
Will this tinkering with the Social Security system be enough to slow down 
or reverse the trend toward earlier retirement? The threshold above which So- 
cial Security benefits are reduced for every dollar in earnings is already so 
high that it does not affect the participation decision (Friedberg 1996). Under 
currently legislated changes, workers will still be able to collect actuarially 
reduced benefits at age sixty-two. Even if  the early retirement age is raised, 
workers will still be able to apply for Social Security disability benefits and 
to receive these benefits without having to accept any actuarial reduction in 
retirement benefits. Krueger and Pischke (1992) found that, when a legislative 
change substantially and unexpectedly reduced benefits to individuals who 
were born after 1916, a change that led to a worker who retired at age sixty- 
five after a career of earning the average wage to receive Social Security bene- 
fits that were 13 percent lower than if he had been born in 1916, this reduction 
had very little effect on retirement trends. This book has shown that, over time, 
income has exerted less and less of an effect on the retirement decision. If this 
insensitivity to income arises from social norms, perhaps established by Social 
Security, then a reversal is certainly possible. But I have shown that this insen- 
sitivity arises in part from the relatively high wealth levels of today’s retirees 
and the affordability of mass tourism and mass entertainment, both of which 
enable the elderly to pursue the good life. If incomes continue to rise, and if 
leisure-time activities continue to be relatively inexpensive and enticing, then 
the rise of retirement is unlikely to reverse. 
Nor is the rise of retirement likely to reverse because of the improving health 
of the elderly. Retirement rates have been rising in spite of improving health, 
and health is becoming less and less important to the retirement decision. A 
temporary reversal is possible if, in the tight labor markets likely to prevail 196  Chapter9 
when the baby-bust generation reaches prime working ages,  jobs become avail- 
able that not only are part-time but also permit time off for extended periods 
of  travel. A reversal is also possible if the early age of  retirement for Social 
Security were changed unexpectedly or if benefits were sharply and unexpect- 
edly reduced so that households who depend primarily on Social Security for 
their retirement income found themselves facing a shortfall in savings. These 
households would either have to postpone retirement and extend their working 
life, accept transfers from their children, or experience a large decline in retire- 
ment consumption. 
Rather than postpone retirement when faced with unexpected benefit cuts, 
the elderly may choose to reduce their consumption. In the case of men who 
involuntarily retired sooner than expected, Hausman and Paquette (1987) ob- 
served declines in consumption. The elderly could reduce their consumption 
by living with their children. But I showed that the effect of changes in income 
on the coresidence decision has become smaller since the turn of the century. 
Independent living may be not only relatively inexpensive but also much more 
highly valued than it was in the past. Migration may permit the elderly to cope 
with income declines while still maintaining their standard of living. Improve- 
ments in transport have made the elderly more mobile than they were in the 
past. Graves and Knapp (1988) argue that, because the elderly have incomes 
that are independent of their residential locations, they move where the value 
of amenities, such as climate, is reflected in labor rather than in land markets. 
By forming communities at the fringes of such areas the elderly rapidly gain 
the political clout to use tax monies for the purchase of  the goods that they 
want, substituting senior centers and golf courses for playgrounds and public 
schools. They can thus both lower the price of recreation and increase the vari- 
ety of recreational goods. In fact, as this book points out, both the increased 
public provision of recreational facilities and technological change have made 
income a less important component of recreation and retirement extremely at- 
tractive. Even the elderly with low incomes who cannot afford mass tourism 
can afford mass entertainment such as television. Provided that the elderly have 
enough income to live independently of their children and to enjoy low-cost 
recreational activities, they are likely to feel more time rather than income 
constrained. Under these circumstances a reversal in retirement rates is un- 
likely. 
Notes 
1. In  1970 life expectancy was seventy-one at birth and fifteen at  age sixty-five. In 
199  1 the respective life expectancies were seventy-six and seventeen (National Center 
for Health Statistics 1995). 
2. See tables 14,25,  and 37 in Health Care Financing Review: Medicare and Medic- 
aid Statistical Supplement (1 996). 